TOP SECRET / JMWAVE / AMWORLD / NOFORN
CASE FILE
The Brigade
CUBAN EXILE OPERATIONS — PERSONNEL ASSESSMENT

They came out of Havana with nothing but rage and American promises. Doctors, lawyers, cane cutters, casino managers. Sons of families who'd owned half of Oriente Province. Soldiers from Batista's army with nowhere else to go. The Agency called them "assets." They called themselves la brigada.

By 1963, there were perhaps fifteen thousand trained Cuban exiles in South Florida. The CIA had created an army and then abandoned it on a beach. What do you do with an army that has no war?

You point it somewhere else.

• • •
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY — JMWAVE STATION ASSET EVALUATION
SUBJECT: Cuban Exile Military Capabilities — Post-ZAPATA Assessment

Classification: TOP SECRET / RYBAT

Date: 15 August 1962

From: Theodore Shackley, Chief of Station, JMWAVE

1. JMWAVE currently maintains operational relationships with approximately 3,000 trained Cuban exile personnel in the greater Miami area. An additional 400-600 assets are deployed in forward positions (Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica).

2. Core cadre consists of Brigade 2506 survivors supplemented by subsequent AMWORLD recruiting. Training standards remain at paramilitary level, with select personnel qualifying for special operations including infiltration, sabotage, and executive action.

3. SECURITY CONCERN: Asset loyalty is increasingly difficult to assess. Many personnel openly express hostility toward current administration policy. Multiple assets have stated they consider President Kennedy personally responsible for Bay of Pigs failure.

4. RECOMMENDATION: Maintain operational tempo to preserve asset morale and discipline. Idle assets present unacceptable security risk.

JMWAVE was the largest CIA station in the world outside of Langley. Three hundred case officers running four hundred corporations. Boat repair shops that never repaired boats. Real estate firms that only sold safe houses. All of it hidden in plain sight along the Miami waterfront, humming with the energy of men who had nothing left to lose.

The scale is difficult to grasp without context. At its peak, JMWAVE controlled more aircraft than most Latin American air forces. Its maritime operations exceeded the Cuban navy. The station's annual budget was classified even from Congress. What the Agency built in Miami was not an intelligence operation. It was an invasion force waiting for an order that never came. — CDJ
• • •
Bay of Pigs invasion, April 1961
Playa Girón, 19 April 1961. The day Kennedy "abandoned" them. The day they swore to remember.
BRIGADE 2506 — KEY PERSONNEL (PARTIAL)
2506-A
Felix Rodriguez
Former Brigade infiltration team leader. Bay of Pigs survivor. Subsequently assigned to OPERATION MONGOOSE / ZRRIFLE support. Reportedly maintains contact with David Atlee Phillips and Miami Station personnel. Current status: ACTIVE ASSET.
2506-B
Antonio Veciana
Founder, Alpha 66 (anti-Castro paramilitary). Claims direct contact with CIA case officer using alias "Maurice Bishop." Allegedly observed Bishop meeting with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas, September 1963. Assessment: UNRELIABLE but operationally significant.
2506-C
Herminio Diaz Garcia
Former bodyguard to Santos Trafficante in Havana. Trained marksman. Bay of Pigs veteran. Implicated by HSCA informants in Dallas operation. Deceased 1966 (Cuba, circumstances disputed).
2506-D
Eladio del Valle
Pilot, drug trafficker, anti-Castro activist. Associate of David Ferrie and Carlos Marcello. Found murdered February 22, 1967—same day Ferrie died. Case unsolved.

The pattern was always the same. Agency man recruits exile. Exile receives training, weapons, mission. Mission fails or is cancelled. Exile is abandoned but retains training, weapons, contacts. Exile is approached by other interested parties—organized crime, rival exile factions, foreign intelligence services.

The Agency created a resource that anyone could tap.

• • •
FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE — ELSUR TRANSCRIPT

Location: 3 Points Bar, Miami, FL

Date: 14 September 1963

Subjects: Unidentified Cuban Males (UCM-1, UCM-2)

UCM-1: ...promises, always promises. Three years of promises. UCM-2: The Company uses us when it's convenient. Then Kennedy tells them to stop, and they stop. UCM-1: Not all of them stop. UCM-2: [Inaudible] UCM-1: I'm saying there are people in the Agency who feel the same way we do. People who remember the beach. People who know who's really responsible. UCM-2: Be careful what you say. UCM-1: I'm just saying—when the time comes, we won't be alone. We have friends. In the right places. [LONG PAUSE] UCM-2: What places? UCM-1: Places he's going to be. The Italians have people. So do we. So does [INAUDIBLE].

[TRANSCRIPT FLAGGED FOR REVIEW. NO ACTION TAKEN. FILED 9/16/63.]

The FBI had them under surveillance. So did the Miami Police intelligence unit. So did the Secret Service, sporadically. Everyone was watching. No one was coordinating. The exile community leaked like a sieve in all directions, and every agency caught fragments of a picture no one assembled.

After Dallas, the Warren Commission would interview exactly zero members of the anti-Castro Cuban exile community in any depth. The HSCA, fifteen years later, would find this omission "inexplicable." It wasn't inexplicable. It was policy. You don't investigate the people you're still using. — CDJ
• • •
TRAINING FACILITY ASSESSMENT — LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN, LOUISIANA
Date of Survey: July 1963
Facility Type: Paramilitary / Small Arms / Explosives
Sponsorship: Carlos Marcello organization (front: Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front)
Personnel Observed: 15-20 Cuban exiles, rotating basis
Training Staff: David Ferrie (pilot, explosives), Guy Banister (tactical, intelligence)
NOTATION: Facility raided by FBI 31 July 1963. Explosives and weapons seized. No arrests made. Training resumed at alternate location within 72 hours.

The camps existed in a jurisdictional void. The Neutrality Act forbade private military operations against foreign governments. The FBI would occasionally raid a facility, seize some weapons, file a report. Then the camps would reopen somewhere else. Everyone understood the game. The exiles were too useful to prosecute, too dangerous to ignore, too angry to control.

David Ferrie moved between worlds like a ghost. Civil Air Patrol instructor in New Orleans. Pilot for Marcello's organization. CIA contract employee (unacknowledged). He knew Oswald from the CAP. He knew the exiles from the camps. He knew the mobsters from the flights he ran to Guatemala and Cuba.

On the night of the assassination, Ferrie drove through a thunderstorm to Houston. Then to Galveston. Then back to New Orleans. When asked why, he said he'd gone ice skating.

"We were all connected. The Agency, the outfit, the exiles—we were all working the same side of the street. The only people who didn't know that were the American public and the President of the United States."

Brigade 2506 veteran, interview with HSCA investigator, 1977 (subsequently classified)
• • •
JMWAVE TO DIRECTOR — 22 NOVEMBER 1963 — 1847 HRS

1. STATION CONFIRMS REPORTS OF KENNEDY ASSASSINATION IN DALLAS.

2. MULTIPLE EXILE ASSETS UNACCOUNTED FOR AS OF 1200 HRS LOCAL.

3. REQUEST GUIDANCE ON OPERATIONAL POSTURE. RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE STAND-DOWN OF ALL AMWORLD ACTIVITIES PENDING ASSESSMENT.

4. ASSET HERNANDEZ REPORTS ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF "DALLAS OPERATION" CIRCULATING IN EXILE COMMUNITY PRIOR TO 22 NOV. RELIABILITY: UNCONFIRMED.

5. AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS.

The cable was never answered. JMWAVE went dark for seventy-two hours. When operations resumed, the anti-Castro programs were quietly wound down. The exiles were cut loose again—this time for good.

Some went into the drug trade. Some became contract operators for the Agency in other theaters. Some disappeared into the Florida real estate market, their secrets buried under strip malls and retirement communities.

And some, perhaps, carried different secrets. Secrets about a week in November. About friends in the right places. About the day the Brigade finally got its revenge.

The Warren Commission's published volumes mention Cuban exiles exactly forty-seven times, mostly in the context of Oswald's "Fair Play for Cuba" activities. The phrase "Brigade 2506" appears twice. "JMWAVE" does not appear at all. The largest paramilitary force in the Western Hemisphere, trained by the CIA, burning with hatred for the murdered President—and the official investigation treated them as background noise. Draw your own conclusions. — CDJ

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