This analysis was commissioned to assess mortality patterns among individuals identified as material witnesses, persons of interest, or subjects of investigation in connection with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963.
The cohort ("Dallas Cohort") was assembled from Warren Commission witness lists, subsequent congressional inquiry records, and investigative files provided by the commissioning party. Individuals were included based on documented connection to the investigation, not speculation regarding involvement.
Cohort Parameters:
Purpose: To determine whether observed mortality within this population deviates significantly from actuarial expectations, and if so, to characterize the nature and magnitude of that deviation.
Expected mortality was calculated using standard life tables (U.S. Population, 1960-1970, age-adjusted). Cause-of-death distributions were benchmarked against CDC vital statistics for the corresponding periods.
Statistical significance was assessed at the p < 0.05 threshold. Variance from expected values is expressed as percentage deviation and standard deviation from mean.
Deaths were categorized according to official cause of death as recorded on death certificates or medical examiner reports. In cases where official determinations were disputed or revised, the original ruling was used for consistency.
| Period | Cohort Size | Expected Deaths | Actual Deaths | Variance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1963-1966 | 67 | 2.3 | 14 | +508% |
| 1967-1970 | 53 | 1.8 | 8 | +344% |
| 1971-1974 | 45 | 1.5 | 5 | +233% |
| 1975-1976 | 40 | 0.7 | 6 | +757% |
Note: Cohort size decreases each period due to prior deaths and natural attrition.
Cumulative mortality over the observation period: 33 deaths observed against 6.3 expected. This represents a variance of +424% from actuarial projections.
The probability of this variance occurring by chance in a random population sample is less than 1 in 1017.
Expected Distribution (U.S. General Population, 1960-1976):
| Cause | Expected % | Dallas Cohort % | Ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural Causes | 72% | 30% | 0.42x |
| Accident | 15% | 27% | 1.8x |
| Suicide | 8% | 21% | 2.6x |
| Homicide | 5% | 22% | 4.4x |
Anomalies Flagged:
The following entries represent cases with notable timing, circumstance, or cause-of-death anomalies. This is not a complete list of cohort mortality.
ADDITIONAL CASE FILES: Sullivan, W.C. (FBI, hunting accident, 1977); Bowers, L.E. (grassy knoll witness, auto accident, 1966); Hunter, W.D. (Long Beach PD, shot in police station, 1964); Koethe, J. (journalist, karate chop to throat, 1964); Howard, T.H. (Ruby attorney, heart attack, 1965); Cheramie, R. (warned of assassination 11/20, hit-and-run, 1965). Complete enumeration maintained under separate cover (HA-77-0342-A).
Observed mortality within the Dallas Cohort exceeds actuarial expectations by a factor of 5.2x over the study period. This variance is not distributed evenly across time; mortality spikes correlate with:
The cause-of-death distribution is profoundly anomalous. Violent death (homicide, suicide, accident) accounts for 70% of cohort mortality, compared to 28% in the general population of similar age and demographic profile.
The timing correlation between scheduled testimony and death—particularly the three cases of death within 72 hours of subpoena or scheduled appearance—represents a statistical anomaly that cannot be explained by standard actuarial models.
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to determine causation. We can only report that the observed mortality pattern in this cohort is, in actuarial terms, impossible.
This analysis is subject to the following limitations:
Notwithstanding these limitations, the magnitude of variance from expected mortality is so extreme that methodological adjustments cannot account for it. Even with aggressive correction factors applied to account for potential cohort bias, observed mortality remains at minimum 3.1x expected values.
Further investigation is recommended.
I've been doing this work for twenty-three years. Exposed populations—asbestos workers, combat veterans, coal miners. I know what elevated mortality looks like.
I've never seen numbers like this.
The model doesn't break. The model can't break. That's the point of a model—it accounts for variance, for outliers, for the thousand small ways that life deviates from the mean. That's what the confidence intervals are for.
But these numbers break the model.
I don't know what happened in Dallas. I only know that whatever happened, it didn't stop on November 22nd. And it didn't stop with Lee Oswald. The killing went on. The dying went on. And nobody seems to have noticed the pattern.
Or maybe they noticed. Maybe that was the point.